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Michelman: Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property

APPENDIX
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND
THE LAW OF PROPERTY*
Frank I. Michelman**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Is it true that in economics lie answers to the ethical conundrums implicit in
legal coercion?' This chapter considers the question with respect to the law of
property. Its thesis is that not even a presumptive preference for the rudiments of
private property-much less a conclusive case for any detailed configuration of
rules conforming to those rudiments-is obtainable by economic reason from
empirically verified premises. Now, that is not to say that private property is
unjustifiable, but rather that the justifications must finally appeal to kinds of
premises and arguments-call them moral premises and arguments-that
economic reason aims at circumventing.
It is true that the norm for social ordering invoked by economic analysisthat is, the norm of efficiency-seems as neutral, as indisputable, as any such
norm could be. One has only to start with a factual judgment that, far from being
controversial, borders on the pragmatically irresistible; that is, that our actions as
human individuals are rationally motivated, in the minimal sense of aiming at
general satisfaction of consistently ordered sets of privately experienced wants or
preferences. Efficiency, then, just means arranging matters so as to allow for as

* © New York University Press. Reprinted, with permission, from NOMOS XXIV: Ethics,
Economics, and the Law 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y.U. Press 1982).
Citations have been reformatted to conform to the ALWD Citation Manual.
** Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. See Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 307 (1979) [hereinafter Michelman, Comment on Uses and Abuses]; Frank I. Michelman,
Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1015, 1043-45 (1978)
[hereinafter Michelman, Norms and Normativity]; Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 (1980) [hereinafter
Posner, Efficiency Norm]; Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 281,292 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Uses and Abuses].
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much such satisfaction as nature's immutable laws permit.2 The weak premises of
rationality and efficiency are, however, insufficient to determine an ideal form of
property law. The efficiency of private property is a hypothesis dependent, not
only on behavior rationally directed toward satisfying individual wants, but on
questions about the contents of the wants and the social propensities of their
bearers-some of which may be empirically determinable, while others can only
be imputed through moral intuition or moral reason.
The extreme counterthesis to this essay's is what we may call the
presumptive efficiency thesis (PET). It is important to see that PET, at its best, is
not itself insensitive to contingencies of actual wants and proclivities. PET may
well regard private property (PP), not as a unique order having detailed
specifications, but as a set of orders sharing the same general form, within which
the details can vary while the form remains clearly opposed to that of obviously
non-PP orders such as collective ownership or an unregulated "state of nature."
PET, then, would be the notion that efficiency is both a general and a peculiar
virtue of the PP form-general in the sense that efficiency is presumptively an
attribute of the PP form as such, as applied to whatever domain of valued objects
you like; peculiar in the sense that given any particular domain, and any proposed
regime for ordering it that is identifiably not PP, there is always presumed to be
some PP way that is more efficient than the proposed alternative (the details of
which will depend on the special facts pertaining to actual wants and proclivities).
The claim here is that PET is false even in this most reasonable, highly adaptable
version.
II.

COMPARING FORMS OF REGIMES
FOR PRESUMPTIVE EFFICIENCY

A.

The Private Property Torso

To think of private property regimes (PP) as presumptively efficient is, it
seems, to have at least vaguely in mind an ideal type of PP-an institutional
paradigm to which actual regimes may be observed to conform or not.
Some elements of the PP form are easy to identify. Any legal order must
contain both rules governing initial acquisition by agents in the order of use and
control of valued objects, and rules governing reassignment from one agent to
another.3 In a "private property" order, it will be readily agreed, the rules must
conform to at least the following principles:

2. There is, of course, a very controversial ambiguity as between the norm of collective
maximization (utilitarianism) and that of universal "maximization" (paretianism). We can avoid that
controversy here by way of a benign pretense that these two versions of efficiency come practically to
the same thing, on the principle of the bigger the pie, the bigger the slices. See generally Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 671
(1980); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. Leg.
Stud. 431, 435-40 (1980); Posner, Efficiency Norm, supra n. 1.
3. Rules regarding adverse possession or user that eventuates in both obliteration of an old title
and inception of a new one are treated in this chapter as belonging to the "initial acquisition" category.
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InitialAcquisition
1. Sole ownership: The rules must allow that at least some objects of utility
or desire can be fully owned by just one person. To be "full owner" of something
is to have complete and exclusive rights and privileges over it-the "rights"
meaning that others are legally required to leave the object alone save as the
owner may permit, and the "privileges"
meaning that the owner is legally free to
4
do with the object as he or she wills.
2. Self-ownership: The rules must prescribe that each individual is full owner
of his or her natural body, talents, and labor power.
3. Ownership of product: The rules must prescribe that whoever owns all the
factor inputs to any product owns the product. (Rules governing cases of
production using factors owned by more than one person must be designed so as
to reinforce actual social respect for property in factors.)
Reassignment
4. Freedom of transfer: Owners are both immune from involuntary
deprivation or modification of their ownership rights and empowered to transfer
their rights to others at will, in whole or in part.
B.

Private Property Compared With What?

We need some reasonably clear conceptions of regimes that are decidedly
not PP, with which PP regimes can be compared for presumptive efficiency. It will
be convenient to have three of these before us:
1. State of nature (SON). In a state-of-nature (SON) regime there are never
any exclusionary rights. All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish,
and are able to do, with whatever objects (conceivably including persons) are in
the SON.'
2. Regulatory regime (REG). The converse of SON is a regulatory regime
(REG), in which everyone always has rights respecting the objects in the regime,
and no one, consequently, is ever privileged to use any of them except as
particularly authorized by the others.6 (Rules for determining when such
authorization exists may vary along several axes. At one extreme, authorization
would require near-simultaneous unanimous consent; tending toward the other
extreme would be a rule defining authorization as expressions of consent from any
two persons occurring within the same twelve-month time span. The latter rule
constitutes an REG: under it, each person always has a right that each of the
others shall leave the covered objects alone except insofar as authorization is
obtained.)

4. It is an open question whether the notion of full ownership must encompass entitlement to be
compensated for unintended or otherwise "excusable" harm to things owned. See Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Propertyand ContractEfficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711,767-68 (1980).
5. Compare id. at 754-55.
6. Compare id. at 755-56.
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3. Forced sharing for needs (FSN). SON and REG both distinguish
themselves from PP by strongly negating the PP principle of sole ownership.
Forced sharing for needs (FSN) instead attacks the PP principle of ownership of
one's product. An FSN regime always resembles some counterpart version of PP,
departing from the PP counterpart only in the following feature: anyone who
"needs" a thing and doesn't have it (or its equivalent in cash or credit) may take or
requisition it from anyone else who has it and doesn't "need" it, and the state will
intervene, if necessary, on the side of the needy taker. (For convenience, let us
imagine rules clearly defining "need" in objective terms referring only to currently
observable states of affairs. These may define "need" quite broadly-e.g., having
in one's possession at this moment less than two thirds of the per capita average
share of privately held national wealth-or quite narrowly-e.g., being diabetic
and lacking insulin for an overdue shot.)
C.

Controllingfor Distributionand Rights

Calling private property presumptively efficient makes sense only as a
statement that, for any given non-PP regime, there is probably some workable PP
regime that, while otherwise equivalent, is more efficient. We have begun to form
some rough idea of the meaning of PP and non-PP. But what does the term
"otherwise equivalent" mean?
Surely one might have grounds other than comparative efficiency for
choosing among regimes. A regime might be preferred for the sake of its
expected distributional outcomes, or because it conforms to extraeconomic
conceptions of rights. Such concerns might immediately dictate the choice among
regimes without regard to efficiency comparisons; or efficiency comparisons might
be relevant but not necessarily controlling, given some "social welfare function"
that specifies the form and rate of exchange7 among efficiency and other concerns.
We need some conceptual apparatus by which to control for possible
concerns about distribution and rights, and so keep our comparisons among
regimes (or classes thereof) strictly focused on efficiency. We need, in particular,
to make sure that preferences for PP vis-A-vis SON, REG, or FSN, even when
experienced or expressed as if motivated by efficiency concerns, are not really
grounded in some other dimension of morality.
The appropriate set of controls is not hard to discover. We first assume that
we have an adequate definition of the PP and non-PP categories. Next, we assume
a distributional criterion, D, that specifies the set of acceptable distributions, and a
rights criterion, R, that specifies the form and rate of exchange (which might, of
course, be that of lexical superiority) of various rights with efficiency. Finally, we
assume knowledge of the natural facts and laws that determine the most efficient
specification of the PP form that is compatible with both D and R. This excellent
regime we call PP*.
7. The preferred form and rate of exchange may be hierarchical rather than continuously
substitutive-a lexical ordering. Compare Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?: A Response to
ProfessorsCalabresiand Posner, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1980).
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We can use the expression PP to stand for any class of regimes that are
certainly not PP. By analogy with PP*, PP * designates any non-PP regime that
satisfies both D and R. PET, then, is tantamount to the view that (i) there exists at
least one instance of PP*-at least one possible non-PP regime that, given all the
other supposed facts about the world, will in practice allow for due recognition of
all the rights in R and yield distributions compatible with D; and (ii) for every such
PP*, it is the case that (or there is reason to think it likely that) there is a possible
PP* that is more efficient. It is of central importance to the aims of this chapter to
understand that PET entails not only point (ii), but point (i) as well. If you think
(i) is false, you are committed to PP on grounds that have nothing to do with
efficiency. You are, moreover, committed to rejecting PET insomuch as PET is
the thesis that PP regimes are presumptively more efficient than otherwise
equivalent PP regimes; because whatever the term "otherwise equivalent" might
mean, it seemingly cannot encompass regimes that fail, where PP succeeds, in
securing distributional or noneconomic rights.
Thus, if R is such as directly to require establishment of sole ownership (thus
ruling out SON and REG), or directly to condemn any nEeds-based
redistributions of product (thus ruling out FSN), then a preference for PP* over
SON, REG, or FSN is fully determined by these extraeconomic considerations,
and efficiency is beside the point of the comparisons. Again, if the supposed facts
are such that SON simply cannot be constrained (while still remaining a
cognizable version of SON) so as to generate a D-compatible distribution, then
rejection of SON in favor of PP* is fully determined by a preference for a certain
range of distributional outcomes, and efficiency is beside the point.
III.

A.

THE COMPOSITION PRINCIPLE OF THE

PP

FORM

The Question of Composition

The four "torso" principles of sole ownership, self-ownership, ownership of
product, and freedom of transfer s are not by themselves sufficient to characterize
regimes that are recognizably and distinctively PP. Also needed are rules
governing the composition of allowable ownership claims-or, as it might be
described, for "packaging" 9 marketable goods into legally cognizable objects of
ownership. A few illustrations will confirm the need.
Take first the case of airspace overlying the earth's surface. Is that legally
subdivisible at all? Is it subdivisible, but only into sole exclusive ownership
domains along this or that configuration of space-time coordinates-for example,
by a rule that assigns to the owner of a surface parcel sole exclusive ownership of

8. See text accompanying suprann. 3-4.
9. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the LiberalState 170 (Yale U. Press 1980). Ackerman
is directly concerned with the composition problem as it pertains to individual versus collective
ownership, but not with other dimensions of the problem we are about to discuss.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 10
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:663

the superadjacent space?1° Or might the subdivision occur along different
conceptual axes? For example, we distinguish "rights" (of exclusion) from
"privileges" (of entry and use), and then assign to each individual "sole
ownership" of a privilege over the whole spherical envelope (namely, I am the
sole owner of my world-encompassing privilege in that I alone determine how and
when I exercise it)-with the result, by deduction, that no one initially has any
exclusionary rights.
Or, conversely, we assign to each individual an allencompassing right, so that it becomes true for each that no other is free to enter
or act within the envelope without the permission of the former-and no one,
therefore, initially has any privileges."
Without at this point saying anything stronger, we can safely conclude that
the PP form must require some restriction on decomposition of full ownership into
privileges held without their congruent rights, or rights without their congruent
privileges. A regime totally void of such restrictions could hardly count as PP,
because a scheme of universally distributed, all-encompassing privilege is,
precisely, a commons, a type of regime (SON) that is opposite to PP if any type is;
whereas the converse scheme of universally distributed, all-encompassing rights is
just an extreme of collectivization (REG) no less starkly opposed to PP than is the
state of nature; and schemes that go part way to either of those extremes will be
cognizable, then, not as pure PP, but as mixtures of PP and something else.1 2 To
be the full owner of something just is to be, at once, the one who is both legally
free to occupy and enjoy it and legally authorized to say what anyone else may do
with it.
Further compositional ambiguity yet lurks in the notion of "something,"
even if we strongly rule out of PP all regimes that countenance any degree of
right/privilege decomposition. Are "objects" restricted to entities describable
using spatial coordinates? using space-time coordinates? to members of some
discernible typology of natural wholes? Do all such entities qualify as ownable
objects? Examples of the various questions crowd to mind: May it be that I am the
owner of a certain ten-acre field on odd-numbered days, while you own it the rest
of the time? 13 May it be that I own, continuously and forever, one half of the field
while you own the other half-but our halves are spatially configured like the redand-black halves of a checkerboard, and the blocks are each one centimeter

10. Such was professedly the traditional rule of the common law. See e.g. Charles Donahue, Jr.,
Thomas E. Kauper & Peter W. Martin, Cases and Materials on Property: An Introduction to the
Concept and the Institution 359-81 (West 1974).
11. For fuller discussion of the concepts of right and privilege, and of the contradictory relation
between them, see Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 4, at 752-56.
12. See id. at 755-56, 766-67.
13. The traditional common law rules allow for division of ownership along temporal lines, i.e., into
"present" and "future" "estates." See e.g. Donahue et al., supra n. 10, at 541-60. The rules do not,
however, permit unrestricted temporal subdivision ad libitum, but only subdivision according to some
one of a finite set of recognized patterns. See Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893) (Holmes, J.:
"A man cannot create a new kind of inheritance."); Donahue et al., supra n. 10, at 541-60. The
alternating-days pattern proposed in the text is not among the recognized ones.
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square?1 4 May I own the whole thing, permanently, as respects beet culture, while
you own all the rest? 5 May I own the toothpaste while you own the tube?1 6 Note
that all of these may be construed as questions both about the regime's rules for
initial acquisition (e.g., may I be allowed to acquire just the beet-raising
"easement" by "first occupancy"?), and its rules for reassignment (e.g., may I,
fully owning the tube of toothpaste, make A the owner of the tube and B the
owner of the paste?)
B.

Composition Constraintson PP

It will now be apparent why the torso principles do not constitute a set of
sufficient conditions to qualify regimes as PP or not-PP, for purposes of
presumptive-efficiency comparisons between the two classes. A regime that
reserved all industrial capital to collective ownership or defined all the land as a
commons of universal privilege, which would qualify as PP under the torso
principles, would not so qualify in presumptive-efficiency talk. For sufficient
definition of a PP category suitable to presumptive-efficiency discourse, we need
some principle or principles of composition stronger than those implicit in torso 1
(some objects have to be fully owned by individuals at least initially) and torso 4
(owners can subdivide their holdings).
As one speculates on the matter, there seem to be at least four candidate
composition principles for distinguishing presumptively efficient PP regimes,
which we can call the principles of ad hoc efficiency (composition rules are fixed
from time to time with a view to efficiency in light of current knowledge of
individual wants and proclivities); mandatory sole ownership (no privileges
unaccompanied by congruent rights, or vice versa, can be initially acquired and/or
reassigned); internalization (holdings are configured according to rules set with a
view to coordination without need for large-number transactions); and
nonintervention (no state ownership or state dictation of composition in initial
acquisition or reassignment).
The first two candidates can be rather quickly disposed of.

14. Nothing in the common law rules inveighs against a checkerboard subdivision, despite its
obvious tendency toward economic inconvenience. Compare Leo Sheep Co. v. U.S., 440 U.S. 668
(1979).
15. Such an arrangement can perhaps be approximated under the common law rules, using
recognized ownership categories of "easement in gross" and "profit-a-prendre," see e.g. Donahue et al.,
supra n. 10, at 1028-63, or those of "fee simple on a condition subsequent," see e.g. id. at 546-47, 581-82,
or "fee simple subject to a restrictive covenant." See e.g. id. at 1102-48. There is a question, however,
about the degree of permanency that is legally attainable by such arrangements. See e.g. id. at 703-10,
1057-63, 1096-1101, 1170-78.
16. It seems we can make such an arrangement if we are careful about it, although some degree of
hostility toward proprietary separation of the functionally inseparable is expressed in the common law
doctrines of "accession" and "confusion," for which see generally Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of
PersonalProperty ch. 6 (2d ed., Callaghan & Co. 1955).
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Ad Hoc Efficiency

As a composition principle for distinguishing PP orders from others for
purposes of presumptive-efficiency comparison, that of periodically revising the
regime's composition rules with a view to efficiency would be merely illusory. The
ad hoc principle cannot distinguish between private property and, say, "market
socialism." It just restates the problem that sent us looking for a "strong"
principle of PP composition.
2.

Mandatory Sole Ownership

The conceptually cleanest way to demarcate PP from the classes of regimes
perceived as opposite to it is just to rule out of PP the kinds of entitlement
configurations that seem definitional for the non-PP classes-that is, privileges
without congruent rights that characterize a commons, and rights without
congruent privileges that characterize a collective. (Under this principle of
mandatory sole ownership, PP regimes could still exhibit a variety of composition
rules. For example, a regime might have a rule allowing privileges to enter the
airspace envelope to be chopped into arbitrarily tiny spatiotemporal bits, or a rule
assigning the privilege respecting the entire earth's envelope to just one person, or
a rule assigning the privilege in a sector of the envelope to the owner of the
adjacent surface7-and any of those regimes would qualify as PP as long as
whoever had a privilege also always had the congruent exclusionary right.)
The trouble with mandatory sole ownership as a composition principle for
presumptively efficient PP regimes isn't, then, that the principle fails to distinguish
among regimes, but that it fails to describe a regime that is either plausibly
efficient or much like the modified common-law regime we know as "private
property." As applied to initial acquisition, the sole-ownership principle would
imply that our own law has been presumptively inefficient when it has assigned
the high seas and navigable airspace as free transit zones over which there are no
exclusive rights;18 or has prescribed that streams and lakes were subject to rights
held jointly by all the riparian owners, none of whom was privileged to deplete or
pollute the water without permission from all the others;19 or even when it has
imposed less than absolute liability for harm inflicted by one upon legally
cognizable interests of another, by allowing such defenses as due care, emergency,
duress, and fair competition.'o As applied to reassignment, the principle would
imply that individuals have acted inefficiently when they have privately and

17. I.e., the common law rule. See supra n. 10.
18. See e.g. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1976) (as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 403); Ill. C. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
19. Such was the traditional English ("natural flow") rule. In the eastern United States it was
generally supplanted by a rule allowing each riparian to make "reasonable use" of the flow (most
characteristically, for modest domestic uses) despite resulting harm to co-riparians. See e.g. Donahue
et al., supra n. 10, at 392-99. In either version ("natural flow" or "reasonable use"), the riparian system
is one of right/privilege decomposition: "natural flow" is a system of joint rights without privileges,
while "reasonable use" is a combination of such a system with one of common privilege without rights.
20. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra n. 4, at 767-68.
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unanimously agreed to pool their several landholdings in a recreation area open to
the free use of all, or to subject their holdings to a regime of collective controls on
use and development. 21 It is safe to conclude that mandatory sole ownership is too
strong a composition constraint for presumptively efficient PP. We need
something less inflexible, though still tougher than the ad hoc efficiency principle.
3.

Internalization
a.

Composition and Costs of Coordination

Before proceeding to study of the third and fourth candidate composition
principles for the PP form-namely those of internalization
and
nonintervention-it will be in order to examine the relation between composition
and efficiency.
Given a society containing a large number of individuals, a stock of available
resources, and a distribution among the individuals of the society's aggregate
resource wealth, there is at least one "efficient" scheme of deployment of the
various resources such that no alternative deployment could make each person
better off even after compensatory side payments. Let us call such an optimal
allocative scheme S*.
Let us say that the society would benefit from "coordination" whenever it is
the case that S* does not actually obtain (some resources being either idle or used
contrary to the dictates of S*).
Coordination always entails some direct
("transaction") costs, and the existence of those costs always leads to some
shortfall from perfect coordination: the coordinating society always to some
degree approaches S*22 and never attains it. The value of the shortfall is the
society's "deadweight loss"; and the total of the deadweight loss and direct costs of
coordination is the society's economic waste. From the standpoint of a concern
for efficiency, the object of composition rules is minimizing economic waste.23
b.

Internalization

Suppose that all the available resources are owned in common by each
member of the society, so that no coordination at all-much less a close approach
to S*-is possible without the formal concurrence or spontaneous cooperation of
everyone at once. Now suppose, alternatively, that there is at least one

21. E.g., through the common law devices of easement, covenant, and equitable servitude. See e.g.
Donahue et al., supra n. 10, at 1102-65; Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use without Zoning 33-84 (Lexington
Bks. 1972).
22. An inconsequential qualification is required by the theory of the second best, which tells us that
short of actual attainment of S*, successive "approaches" to S* may involve local reversals in the
direction of adjustment of various sectors in the total system of allocation. See e.g. Richard S.
Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best
World: A Proposaland Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics,
1975 Wis. L. Rev. 950.
23. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 414-15 (1977).
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distributionally acceptable way of carving up the resources into individual
holdings in severalty, such that under conditions of moderately imperfect
information and moderately costly communication the individual holders would
be motivated to transact their way stepwise toward S* by way of a series of smallnumber contracts and exchanges. It is true, of' course, that under absolutely
perfect information and costless communications, S* would emerge out of the
ownership-in-common regime as well. But in moderately imperfect conditions,
the amounts of economic waste respectively attendant upon the commonownership and several-ownership regimes are likely to differ.
The composition principle of internalizationreflects a policy favoring several
as opposed to common ownership. The principle is that the rules for composing
the taxonomy of legal ownable objects must be designed so that, given what is
known or believed about people's wants and proclivities and the resultant utilities
attached to various classes of objects, action in accordance with the rules will yield
actual configurations of holdings such that the incidence of cases in which
coordination requires simultaneous agreement among large numbers of owners
will be held to a feasible minimum. Using internalization as the composition
principle that qualifies a regime as PP, one would assign a regime to the PP class if
its rules both conformed to the torso principles and seemed aptly designed for
internalization.
The strategy of internalization is to arrange matters so that the typical
owner, or most owners, will have as few "neighbors" as possible. A configuration
of holdings at the opposite pole from perfect internality, that is, perfect
externality, is one in which everyone is always everyone else's neighbor: each
person owning an undivided fractional share interest in every thing in the world.
Of course, internality is perfect only in a world entirely owned by just one
owner. That possibility, while logically conceivable, is not widely endorsed as
policy.2 4 Still, given any criterion (D)2' of "widespreadness" in distribution,
internality seems to posit a comprehensible goal toward which an optimizing
intelligence can be coherently directed.
Consider this example. 26 A large group of people, n in number, have the
opportunity, at no cost, to acquire an expanse of beach and subdivide it among
themselves. We assume that, while the total area of their pending acquisition is
fixed, they can take it in any shape they choose-circular, square, oblong, and so
forth. They have already settled upon a scheme of equal division by lottery into n
parcels to be severally and exclusively occupied by individuals. The question
comes as to external shape and internal configuration. Just to keep things simple,
suppose for a moment that only two alternatives are available: a row of
rectangular holdings adding up to an extended oblong,
24. To be clear, there is wide endorsement neither of the policy of extreme concentration of wealth
nor that of extreme concentration of management authority over everything in the world. See infra nn.
45-46.
25. See supra pt. II.C.
26. Adapted from Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination:Bargaining and Rules, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 797, 800, 817, 831 et seq. (1973).
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1--ILI
1 11 1-or a honeycomb
accompanying drawing.

of regular hexagonal

holdings as shown

in the

etc.

It is known, we suppose, that people use beach space for just two different
purposes: napping and listening to radios (various stations). Nappers don't like
radio noise, and those listening to one station don't like the noise from another.
At the preferred volume levels, audible radio noise crosses over just one boundary
in every direction, whichever pattern-row of squares or nest of hexagons-is
used.
A property system committed to an internalizing composition chooses the
row-of-squares design. Under the hexagons alternative, each holder will be faced
with the problem of trying to work things out, simultaneously, with each of six
neighbors, each of whom also has to deal at the same time with six neighbors,
three of them different from the neighbors of the first holder, and so on. Very
possibly, some kind of global settlement through a political process will be the best
available solution (e.g., they will elect a legislature that will enact some temporal
and territorial regulations: in the northeast sector only station A can be played; in
the north central, only station B; in the southwest, no radio playing; in others, the
day is carved up among different rules; and so on). Under the squares alternative,
by contrast, it is quite imaginable that a chain of bilateral deals (trading places,
sorting out time periods between neighbors) would lead the parties to a feasible
optimum. The preference for small-numbers internality reflects an assumption
that economic waste2 7 is lower in these bilateral-chain dealings then in the global
political process. (If the parties placed an absolute value on efficiency supposedly

27. For the definition of this term, see the text accompanying supra note 23.
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associated with strict bilaterality, such that they were willing to sacrifice to that
end their distributional preference for equal holdings, they could achieve or
approach bilaterality by allowing one of their number to become sole owner
[landlord] of their entire beach site. This owner would then lease out portions in
such sizes, shapes, and patterns, for such durations, and subject to such restrictions
on radio playing, as seemed apt to maximize rental revenues; and so a chain of
bilateral deals could, again, emerge to lead the parties up Mt. Optimus.)
There is at least some degree of plausibility in the idea that by adding to the
four torso principles that of an internalizing strategy for composition rules, we
capture the essence of the PP category as it occurs in presumptive-efficiency
assessment. This way of completing the definition of the PP form seems to find
the economic essence of private property, fittingly enough, in what we may call
market structure aimed at accommodating coordination through small-number
contracts and exchanges as opposed to political decision or extralegal cooperation.
Moreover, the regime we commonly know as private property in fact abounds in
restrictions on decomposition of titles that can be understood to reflect a policy of
internalization: restrictive doctrines respecting easements in gross, 28 perpetuities2 9
covenants running with the land, 3° restraints on alienation, 3 duration of co32
33
tenancies," "novel" easements and estates, to name just some of the pertinent
34
technicalities of the land law. Scholars and judges 35 have associated many of the
restrictive doctrines with efficiency goals. To be sure, there may be plausible
accounts of many of them, or perhaps all, that make no appeal to efficiency.16 Yet
it would be folly to insist that none37is, as a matter of fact, conducive to efficiency
whether designedly or accidentally.
4.

Nonintervention

Now, it is an unfortunate but inescapable complication-not to say an
embarrassment-to our project of defining the essential form of supposedly
efficient PP that the internalization principle for composition rules is not only
market structuring, but also market hindering. It is market hindering insomuch as

28. See e.g. Donahue et al., supra n. 10, at 1053-63.
29. See e.g. id. at 686-71.
30. See e.g. id. at 1114-38.
31. See e.g. id. at 667-78.
32. E.g. Clark v. Clark, 58 A. 24 (Md. 1904) (refusing to enforce a stipulation, in a gift of land to
seven persons as tenants-in-common, that the usual recourse of tenants-in-common to judicially
supervised partition would be suspended for ten years).
33. See e.g. Alfred F. Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 Cal. L. Rev. 125 (1942); supra n. 13.
34. E.g. Myres Smith McDougal & David Haber, Property, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Planning and
Development 246-51, 479-83 (Michie Casebook Corp. 1948).
35. E.g. N.W. Real Est. Co. v. Serio, 144 A. 245, 247-48 (Md. 1928) (Bond, C.J., dissenting);
Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946 (Mass. 1885) (Holmes, J.).
36. For example, the Rule Against Perpetuities is often explained as motivated by a concern for
intergenerational equity, or for countering social stratification arising out of long-lasting concentrations
of wealth within particular families. See e.g. Lewis M. Simes & Allan F. Smith, The Law of Future
Interests § 1117 (2d ed., West 1956).
37. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra n. 4, at 764, 767.
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it calls for composition rules at all. Internalization policy is, precisely, the policy of
frustrating private parties bent upon excessive decomposition. And vet it seems
hard to deny that market freedom-the absence of economic policy control by the
state-is also of the essence of the PP category in comparative-efficiency
discourse.
We have to consider, then, the possibility of defining the PP form as
consisting of the torso principles plus a fifth to the effect that the state simply does
not mandate or restrict composition (and, by deduction, never is an owner itself). 38
In this noninterventionist or antistatist conception of PP, all objects of' utility or
desire must at all times be either in private ownership (sole or multiple, full or
divided, as the parties determine) or be unowned because lost, abandoned,
undiscovered or unoccupied. If unowned, they may be taken into private
ownership by occupation (or its analogues such as invention or creation);3 9 if
owned, they may nevertheless be taken into new ownership by prescription or
adverse possession; and in either case the occupier or prescriber becomes the
owner of just what he took, bounded by whatever spatial, temporal, and functional
limits actually describe his legally operative, possessory acts.
Aside from
occupation and prescription, the only way to become the owner of anything is by
voluntary exercise of some erstwhile owner's power of alienation; and such powers
may be exercised ad libitum to decompose or recompose titles. For example: I
may, over an extended period of time, regularly but nonexclusively, shoot skeet on
Mondays and Fridays on blocks of your field configured like the red part of a
checkerboard; and I shall thereby acquire a nonexclusive checkerboard easement
(privilege) of Monday/Friday skeet-shooting. 41 Or you might confer just the same
title on me by voluntary grant. Obviously, the resulting composition might be a
severe impediment to future coordination.
5.

Reconciling the Principles of Internalization and Nonintervention

Both internalization and nonintervention seem to be of the essence of the
putatively efficient private property form for regimes. Yet, as we have just seen,
the two principles have contradictory implications. The problem now is how to
give each principle its due in the definition of the PP form, without destroying the
coherence of the notion of "private property" as a distinct class of legal orders.
The most straightforward solution is to include both principles in the PP
definition, but to give them separate domains of application. Cleanest, perhaps,
would be to make internalization a principle for rules governing the composition

38. State ownership is a form of state-mandated decomposition, insomuch as there is no individual
who has coextensive rights and privileges respecting state-owned objects. Compare the case of
corporations discussed infra note 45.
39. Compare Richard A. Epstein, PossessionAs the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979).
40. For the approximately similar common law doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive
easement, see, for example, Donahue et al., supra note 10, at 100-140.
41. A common law court undoubtedly would require clear and strong evidence of an obviously
regular pattern of implicitly assertive conduct before it would recognize such an economically
vexatious prescriptive easement. See e.g. id. at 108-09, 130-32.
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of entitlements at the point of initial acquisition and nonintervention the
composition principle for rules governing reassignment. Thus, the taxonomy of
titles that could be gained by occupation, adverse possession, and so on would be
composed according to rules designed to minimize the cases in which large42
number transactions would be needed for coordination thenceforward, whereas
the rules governing reassignment would deal with such matters as formality,
disclosure, and duress but leave decomposition and recomposition of titles
unregulated, to be determined at will by the parties to the reassignments.
This separate-domains solution, while conceptually neat, is unsatisfactory. It
plainly fails to describe the traditional "private property" legal order, which both
allows decomposition by initial acquisition 43 and substantially regulates
decomposition by reassignment." Moreover, the separate-domains solution is far
from making intuitive economic sense. If decomposition hinders coordination, it
does so whether arising from initially acquisitive party activity or from the activity
of reassignment.
The more satisfying if less determinate solution is best approached by
dwelling for a moment on the economic rationale of the nonintervention principle
for composition rules. Nonintervention is a principle tending toward efficiency in
composition just insofar as it is true that the configurations of holdings arrived at
via the nondirected, spontaneous acts of individuals (consisting of first occupancy,
exchange, gift transfer, and the like) will always or generally lend themselves to
cheaper coordination than will configurations dictated or regulated by the state.
Now, the truth of that premise seems to depend on that of one or both of two
subpremises-a first regarding the comparative tendencies of regimes to depart
from the entitlement structures that would actually be amenable to least-cost
coordination under the transient circumstances; a second regarding the
comparative cost of correcting for the departures.
The first subpremise is that the self-interested acts and dealings of
individuals, whether or not they "decompose" ownership, will leave the universe
of holdings from time to time configured more aptly for easy coordination in the
service of individual wants than will the dictates of the state. (A dramatic example
might be the very sophisticated decompositions of sole ownership by which
aggregations of factors are gathered under the unified control of a corporation
management without directly disturbing the wide dispersion of wealth claims. 45)

42. E.g., one who acquires title to a parcel of land by adverse possession might take it (i) subject to
the privileges of others to interfere accidentally and nonnegligently with its use and enjoyment; or (ii)
subject to the liability that intentional or unreasonable interference may not be enjoinable but only
compensable by a damages award. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
43. E.g., the doctrine of prescriptive easement, supra note 40.
44. See text accompanying supra nn. 28-33.
45. The corporation is, of course, well recognized as an "internalization" device. That the device
works by complex decomposition rather than unification of individual ownership claims is clear, if
perhaps not so widely recognized. It is of the essence of "corporate" ownership that no individual has
coextensively broad rights and privileges respecting the objects "in" such ownership. Directors can act
with regard to them only collectively; neither directors nor officers are privileged to use them
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This subpremise does have some intuitive appeal, insomuch as the wants and
interests of individuals are seen as both generating the configuration and calling
for the coordination of its elements. But there seems to be no reason to suppose
that the same individual interests and wants are doing both things, and there's the
rub. The acts and dealings that continuously reassign and redivide holdings are, to
be sure, those of individuals; but, to be no less sure, those acts and dealings will
often affect multiple third-party interests, either immediately (again, the
concentration and redirection of resources through corporations is a striking
example), or under the unknown conditions of an unfolding future. You can't
very easily get eggs out of an omelet. The invisible hand is forever becoming the
dead hand, as every property lawyer knows.46 And although there is no reason to
confide absolutely in either the beneficence or the omniscience of the state as
regulator of property composition, there is also none for trusting more to
accidental regulation by individual dealings. If the state does not always act in
view of the economic interest of society as a whole, neither do individuals.
The second subpremise is that whatever the extant composition of holdings
may be, and however far that composition may have strayed from the one that
would accommodate least-cost coordination under the current circumstances,
economic waste will tend to be less if individuals are left free to recompose
entitlements as they will in private dealings than if composition is dictated or
regulated by the state. Thus, both subpremises lead to just the same question
about the utility of state regulation of composition.
Posed thus abstractly, the question is unanswerable; or, rather, the inevitable
answer to the abstract question is, "sometimes yes, sometimes no." In that
irreducibly ambivalent attitude toward state control of composition lies the answer
to our search for a composition principle to complete the definition of the PP
form. The PP composition principle is that of no-intervention-except-for-thesake-of-internalization, or what we may call the principle of market facilitation:the
state may leave composition unregulated; and insofar as the state ever does
regulate composition, it does so only by rules that conform to the principle of
internalization-that is, the rules are designed with a view to accommodating
coordination through small-number transactions.
It is important to note how this composition principle of market facilitation,
while necessarily weaker than the rejected principle of "mandatory sole
ownership,47 is also enough stronger than that of "ad hoc efficiency" to escape the
objection that it fails to distinguish between regimes that are and are not pp. 48 It is
true that the principle of market facilitation, like that of ad hoc efficiency, allows

otherwise than as authorized by the charter and by votes of the directors; shareholders, who have rights
to prevent unauthorized uses of the objects, have no concomitant privileges of use; and so on.
46. When a given complex of "corporation ownership" claims has become inutile, by reason of scale
diseconomies, monopolization, or whatever, readjustment is fraught with heavy transaction costs,
whether in the form of legally compelled "divestiture"; voluntary "merger," "sale of assets," or
"takeover"; or reassembly of sole ownership through "dissolution."
47. See text accompanying supra nn. 17-21.
48. Supra pts. 11I.B.1 & III.B.2.
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the possibility of decoupled privileges and rights. 49 It allows that possibility,
however, only under rules that aim at market facilitation. It does not countenance
rules that aim directly at efficiency, by avoidance of markets. Unlike the ad hoc
principle, the principle of market facilitation excludes the possibility that a stateimposed commons, or a regime of state command or regulation, may sometimes be
preferable to a market. This preference for markets, it seems, is one
distinguishing mark of the putatively efficient PP class of regimes; another is the
nonintervention bias.
We are now, at last, in a position to set forth the complete set of formal
principles for PP regimes:
Principles GoverningInitialAcquisition

1. Self-ownership: The rules must prescribe that each individual is full
owner of his or her natural body, talents, and labor power.
2. Ownership of product: The rules must prescribe that whoever owns all
the factor inputs to any product owns the product. Rules governing cases of
production using factors owned by more than one person must be designed
so as to reinforce actual social respect for property in factors.
3. Marketfacilitatingcomposition:

(a) internalizationbias: Composition of holdings may be regulated only
by rules designed to avoid excessive dependence of coordination on largenumber transactions.
(b) nonintervention bias: Subject only to principle 3(a), composition of
holdings by initial acquisition is as determined by party action under rules
conforming to principles 1 and 2.
Principles Governing Reassignment

4. Nonexpropriation:Owners are immune from involuntary deprivation
or modification of their ownership rights.
5. Market facilitatingfreedom of transfer:

(a) free alienation:Subject to principles 5(b), (c), owners are empowered
to transfer their ownership rights to others at will.
(b) internalizationbias: Subdivision of holdings by reassignment may be
regulated, but only by rules designed to avoid excessive dependence of
coordination on large-number transactions.
(c) nonintervention bias: Subject only to principle 5(b), composition of
holdings by reassignment is as determined by action of the parties to the
reassignment.

49. See text accompanying supra nn. 10-12.
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IV. THE "MORAL BASIS" OF PET 0

We are ready now to return to this chapter's central claim. Take any R and
any D, and any corresponding PP* and PP,' Then, from the sole factual postulate
that persons are rational maximizers of individual satisfactions, one cannot deduce
that the PP* is-or even is likely to be-the more efficient regime. Such a
deduction must depend always on additional factual or moral premises.
It is possible to compile a short list, of additional premises, the truth of at
least one of which would be required to make the deduction true. My aim is to
show that the additional premises are either (i) false, or (ii) quasi empirical,
meaning that in the present state of knowledge they are not known empirically to
be true and are better understood as moral propositions than as factual ones-as
statements of a view about how things might well be, not of how things are known
to be.
A.

Additional Premises
The list of additional premises is as follows:
a.

PerSe Preferencesfor InstitutionalRoles, States, Experiences

1. People prefer the role and experience of being unmolested producers to
those of (i) being predators in a state of nature or beneficiaries of forced
sharing, and (ii) repulsing predators or fulfilling legal duties of sharing.
2. With regard to some specifiable list of valued objects or experiences (e.g.,
your body, or having total command over what you produce), people
prefer the state of being legally secure in their own possessory claims to
that of being legally free to disregard the reciprocal, possessory claims of
others. 2
3. People prefer the experience of private exchange through markets to that
of public decision through politics, and to that of informal, extralegal
cooperation.

50. Compare Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in NOMOS XXII: Property
187 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y.U. Press 1980).
51. See supra pt. II.C.
52. Note that the list must, as a matter of logical necessity, exclude some of the objects and
experiences that people might value. This is so because any subset of objects and experiences as to
which people supposedly prefer a state of universal security necessarily implies a complementary
subset as to which they supposedly prefer a state of universal exposure and license. My having a secure
command over your body, labor, and product is not logically less eligible as a possible object of
preference than is your contradictory claim to self-possession. Assuring secure self-possession to each
person is equivalent to (i) denying to each person a secure claim to anyone else's body, labor, or
product; and (ii) licensing each person to disregard or interfere at will with the claims (and, where
present, the related needs) described in (i). For more elaborate discussion, see Kennedy &
Michelman, supra n. 4, at 759-62.
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Effect of Uncertainty,Predation,and Forced Sharing on Incentive and
Product

4. Potential producers, anticipating loss of product to legally unrestrained
predation, regulation, or forced sharing, will substitute for some or all of
the production they otherwise would have undertaken some combination
of (i) leisure, (ii) production in less predation-prone or less shareable
form, and (iii) other defensive activity.
5. Potential producers, allowed by law to help themselves to the fruits of
other people's work (whether as predators or forced sharers), will
substitute leisure for some or all of the production they otherwise would
have undertaken.
c.

CoordinationBehavior

6. Failure of coordination, through information failure and strategies of
freeloading and bluffing, will be lesser under a market process in which
large numbers eventually participate through complex chains of smallnumber deals than under a political process of collective decision or an
extralegal process of voluntary cooperation.
This chapter proceeds henceforth on the assumption that belief in PET
requires belief in the truth of at least one of the six additional premises. I see no
way of proving the truth of this assumption. I can only leave it to readers to show
the contrary, if they can, by either (i) explaining how to complete the defense of
PET with nothing but the rational-maximizers premise to go on, or (ii) supplying
some other additional premise that can do the job.
B.

The Additional Premises as Quasi Empirical

1.

The Per Se Preferences

Let us take first the three premises regarding per se preferences for
institutional states, roles, and experiences. Neither observation nor introspection
has established, or seems likely to, that any of them is universally held; to the
contrary, either common" or historical 54 observation, scientific investigation," or
introspection casts grave doubt upon the idea that any of these preferences are
species-characteristic in anything like a universal sense. And once it is granted
that some people may well have converse preferences, any claim to knowledge of

53. E.g., it seems obvious that some individuals choose to live on public assistance who could expect
to attain a higher economic income if they worked.
54. Historical evidence of preferences for political decision modes can be found, e.g., in Hannah
Arendt, On Revolution (Greenwood Press 1963). Historical evidence of preferences for reciprocity
and mutual aid, as distinguished from market exchange, can be found, e.g., in Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation (Farrar & Rinehart 1944).
55. For one recent attempt to synthesize relevant implications of sociobiological inquiry, see
Edward 0. Wilson, On Human Nature (Harv. U. Press 1978).
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how the balance of value lies, when it comes to choosing which among the
conflicting preferences to accommodate, will be deeply unconvincing. (Worse,
one's guesses about these matters will of necessity be rooted in observation of
people conditioned by the prevalence of a particular set of institutions. Worse yet,
those guesses themselves-one's own reading of the contaminated evidence, such
as it is-will be similarly conditioned.)
The additional premises themselves assert that products and leisure do not
exhaust the wants and preferences that may be more or less satisfied in a PP or
non-PP regime and therefore have to be counted in the efficiency comparison.
This assertion, however, opens the door to more possibilities than the premises
allow-for example, that some people have a taste for the hurly-burly of SON or
the political machination of REG; or for legally noncompelled cooperation or
political participation of a type possible only in SON or REG; or that some have a
deep aversion to uncertainty about having their needs go unmet when others are
in a position to help them. There may even be some people who would take
enormous satisfaction in the knowledge of being legally at liberty to go about
using other people's bodies impulsively, as the spirit moves-who like even more
the prospect that the persons within the bodies may fight back-and who are, by
contrast, made miserable by the knowledge of being required to bargain with
other people over the use of their bodies.
One cannot just dismiss such preferences as "nonrational," if rationality is to
16
remain a "weak" premise. Of course, one might discount them as morally
unworthy and thereby perhaps arrive at a preference for PP, in some form, over
SON, REG, and FSN, on noneconomic moral grounds. One can also try
admitting that there may be some people with the licentious preferences, but so
few that their deviant wants are plainly outweighed by those of the host of normal
security-preferrers. Thus would one enter upon quasi empiricism. Surely the
crucial countings and "weighings" are not empirically known or verifiable. Surely
one's sense of conviction about them arises from intellectual faculties hard to
distinguish from those employed in moral intuition and moral reason. Surely their
stuff is the stuff of Ought, though their form be the form of Is.
2.

Uncertainty, Incentive, and Product

Let us now turn to additional premises 4-6, concerned with the untoward
effects on production and satisfaction of the uncertainty (or insecurity) associated
with legalized predation, forced sharing, and the threat of regulation. We take up
three ways in which such uncertainty may be thought to be economically
detrimental, including some further analysis of the supposed per se preference for
security of possession.
a. Uncertainty as an intrinsic bad or cost. Let us start by granting, arguendo,
that uncertainty is, indeed, an intrinsically bad thing to experience. Comparing PP
with FSN or SON, it is obvious that the choice lies not between "more" and "less"

56. See supra pt. I.
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uncertainty but between the kinds of uncertainty various people must bear.57
Under PP, owners are certain of future control of their factors and products (per
contract in the case of joint products), while those whose holdings, productive
capacities, or productive motivations fall short of some critical level are uncertain
of having all their needs met (i.e., by voluntary charity). Under FSN or SON,
uncertainty about having your future needs met may be reduced (if you are
unproductive or a gifted thief),5 while uncertainty about keeping all your present
holdings is certainly increased. Since neither sort of uncertainty is any more or
less compatible with rationality than the other, neither regime can be said, prima
facie, to entail "less" had uncertainty than the other.
Moreover, experience may afford an antidote to uncertainty in SON or FNS.
Farmers, for example, may come to know what fraction of a planted crop they can
normally expect to reap and keep. Indeed, a fairly intelligible equilibrium may
emerge, bolstered and structured by informal agreement. The total of the
bounded uncertainty in a mature SON or FSN regime cannot, prima facie, 59be
supposed either "more" or "less" than that of the (one-sided) uncertainty in pp.
Finally, there is nothing in the rationality premise (at least, not in the weak
or neutral sense that makes rationality almost irresistible as a working
assumption) requiring that uncertainty be regarded as intrinsically bad or costly.
Risk aversion is no more rational than is risk neutrality or a positive adventuring
spirit. Once we drop the arguendo assumption of the intrinsic badness of
uncertainty, it obviously becomes impossible to compare the efficiency of regimes
in terms of the amounts of uncertainty they entail.
b.

Uncertainty and allocation between labor and leisure. It is sometimes

incautiously suggested" 6 (and, one suspects, very widely just taken for granted)
that minimizing the uncertainty of return faced by (potential) producers, at the
same time denying any certainty of returns of potential predators, must certainly
lead to increased total product. The intuitive notion is that the farmer assured of
reaping where he has sown must be the more disposed to sow. The notion is false.
In technical language, the mistake lies in a supposition, baseless so far as
rationality is concerned, that the "substitution effect" of replacing PP with SON
will prevail over the "income effect" 6 -that is, that since in SON the trade-off
between labor and leisure is more favorable to leisure than it is in PP, people will
work less and rest more in SON.
The truth is that the net result depends on how strongly producers value
increments of product vis-A-vis increments of leisure, given this or that extant

57. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra n. 4, at 722-26.
58. It is not logically necessary that this uncertainty would be reduced, insomuch as the forcedsharing requirement might, imaginably, have such a severe depressant effect on total production that
no one's needs could be met. See id. at 724-25.
59. See id. at 717-18.
60. E.g. Sir William Blackstone, Commentariesof the Laws of England *4 (Clarendon Press 1769);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §3.1, 27-28 (2d ed., Little Brown 1977).
61. See e.g. James M. Henderson & Richard E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory §§ 2-6 (2d ed.,
McGraw-Hill 1971).
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combination of the two. If those relative valuations are such that the "income
effect" prevails, a farmer who anticipates losing half of his crop to human
predators will plant (in the limiting case) twice as much as he otherwise would
have, so as to reap no less than would have been the case absent predation-and
the result will be twice as much total product for human consumption under SON
than under PP.
But wait a minute. What about the predator? Isn't it true a priori that
people who in SON manage to live off others, in PP will have to work for their
livings; and that their product, at least, will be greater in PP? Supposing for a
moment that this is true, we still have no way of knowing a priori that the total
product output is greater in PP, given that those who produce in PP may, for all
we know, produce even more in SON. Moreover, it isn't even knowable that
those who are predators in SON will be workers in PP, rather than recipients of
voluntary charity. Nor is the converse knowable, namely that some people who
have to work for a living in PP would, if SON were instituted instead, give up work
in favor of predation; since the case might be that those who, in SON, obtain a
certain standard of living through predation (say, the same as the maximum
standard they can achieve as workers in PP) might find that life in SON at that
standard generates additional wants more cheaply satisfiable by work, given
diminishing returns to predation. Perfectly possibly, these people would work
harder and more productively in SON than in PP-for example, if only in SON,
with the predatory income base (or supplement) there available, did it become
practical for them to think of striving for a total income ample enough for cruises
and oriental rugs.
c. Lawful predationand misallocation to precaution and defense. Here the
notion is that, lacking legal guarantees against predation, producers rationally
must either produce less highly valued (but also less predation-prone) outputs
than they otherwise would have (e.g., gather nuts rather than raise grain), or else
divert labor and resources to defensive outputs (fences, private goon squads,
mayhem) that have zero or negative value as final goods, thereby reducing the real
value of GNP below what it otherwise would have been. Again, the argument
depends on particular assumptions of fact. As we move from PP to SON, farmers
may grow less, but they also may grow more; they may build fences, but they also
may (it depends on comparative cost-effectiveness) just forget the fences and
plant enough for both the predators and themselves (as one does with raspberry
bushes, not bothering with netting or chickenwire because it's easier just to raise
enough fruit to satisfy one's own wants and give the birds a free lunch to boot);
the farmers may divert energies to defensive maneuvers that they find tiresome
and disagreeable, but they also may affirmatively enjoy their skirmishing with
predators (and goon-squad members who otherwise would have languished their
ways through boring lives may find in goon-squading their true m~tiers), oragain-the farmers may just forgo defense altogether.
Just as in the cases of the per se preferences, our counter-speculations about
insecurity and its consequences depend to some extent on the possibility that

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 10
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:663

people have wants or traits that may seem alien or unappealing (or worse) to
"us"-too little self-reliance, too narrow a dependence on some particular form of
consumption, a nasty taste for combat, or whatever. It seems no more open to us
here than it was there to dismiss such inclinations as irrational. But how can we,
then, pretend to know how the balance of preferences lies? The issues here, as
there, are at least partly quasi empirical, our convictions about them just as hard
to disentangle from the ingredients of moral discourse. There is, to be sure, a
historical and anthropological literature offering empirical evidence on some of
these questions, 62 but it is controversial and, at least for now, inconclusive-too
weak a foundation for strong convictions about the rightness or goodness of
private property.63
3.

Coordination Behavior

The last additional premise is that owners of interdependent holdings,
confronting one another in a changing world in which further coordination always
beckons, can make better progress toward perfect coordination (S*) 64 through
numerous, stepwise, small-number dealings than through more massive, if possibly
fewer, feats of large-number coordination. These more massive feats might
imaginably take the form either of regulation through a political process of
collective decision or of cooperation outside the legally coercive institutions of
regulation, property rights, and enforceable contract. What supposed facts about
the human condition lie behind the belief that such processes are generally
doomed to failure, by comparison with what can be achieved through contractual
relations and exchanges based on individualized proprietary holdings?
a.

No Natural Harmony?

Let us recall our hypothetical case of the beach. 65 The preference we there
developed for an internalizing, "bilateralist" composition depended in part on a
belief about the relative costliness, in forgone gains from trade, of the strategic
behaviors respectively associated with large-number and small-number dealings.
But it also, and more obviously, depended on the specific facts assumed about the
actual substance of individual preferences and, relatedly, the utilities of beachbased activities-that is, the assumption that everyone wants above all not to have
to hear noise from anyone else's radio. The example was rigged to yield a choice
for bilateralist composition.
Of course, one could as easily rig a beach case of opposite import-for
example, by supposing it to be known that the only thing anyone likes to do on the
beach is stretch out and listen to music over the radio, everyone has just one radio
of limited power, there is only one station on the air (or there are several, always
62. Collected and cited in John W. Chapman, Justice, Freedom, and Property, in NOMOS XXII:
Property289 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y.U. Press 1980).
63. See Becker, supra n. 50.
64. Seesupra pt. III.B.3.
65. Text accompanying supra nn. 26-27.
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simultaneously broadcasting mutually harmonious music), and the more radios
you hear playing together, the better the music is. Overhearing, in short, far from
being a nuisance, is an unambiguous benefit to all participants. Knowing that to
be true, rational people would prefer the configuration of hexagons to the
alternatives. The law has, indeed, sometimes made such choices. There are
traditional legal doctrines inclining to maximization, not minimization, of
neighborhood interactions understood to be mutually beneficial-for example,
those establishing common rights of transit in the seas and inland
navigable
67
waters, 6 6 and common rights of access to communications forums.
b.

No Trust?

To some extent, then, the belief that a market-structuring (neighborminimizing) composition of holdings yields better coordination than a neighbormaximizing regime of common privilege may depend on belief that cases of
natural interactive harmony (such as our second beach case) occur less frequently
than those of conflictual neighborhood relations. It is hard to fathom the sense in
which such a "fact" might be "known." We need not dwell on the question,
however, because the market-structuring preference can perhaps survive
confession of inability to answer it.
Suppose we don't know in advance which version of the beach story is true,
because we don't know the facts about future radio program content, broadcast
technology, and people's likes and dislikes. If the first (conflictual) version turns
out to be true after we have opted for a nest of hexagons, the way to efficient
reordering lies only through cooperation or politics; but if the second
(harmonious) version turns out to be true after we are committed to a row of
squares, a chain of bilateral transactions conceivably might accomplish the
efficient reordering. Thus, a general preference for market structure may reflect
belief that correction is generally likelier to occur through markets than through
cooperation or politics.
There remains the question of the behavioral suppositions implicit in that
belief, and a crucial one seems to be that persons in potentially conflictual social
situations (beyond the confines of family and friendship) are typically incapable of
acting on mutually trustful premises. No doubt there are substantial risks that
cooperative or political processes will "fail" because of information gaps,
communication difficulties, and destructive strategic responses to such
conditions; 68 but on the other hand there are exactly analogous risks of "market

66. E.g., the "public trust" doctrine, see generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
NaturalResource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
67. Here the salient doctrines are constitutional free speech guaranties. E.g. Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). For a striking example of
preference for the social benefits of unhindered communication over avoidance of the costs of
neighborhood conflict, see People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 277 (N.Y. 1963) (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting).
68. See e.g. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper & Row 1957); George J.
Stigler, The Citizen and the State ch. 8 (U. Chi. Press 1975).
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failure., 69 What makes the risks seem heavier for cooperative and political
processes is, I suggest, their pronounced multiparty character, which seems to
escalate the likelihood that they will constitute "prisoners' dilemmas" or
comparably tragic strategic fixes7° will be, in Mancur Olson's classification,
instances of "latent" rather than "privileged" or "intermediate" groups. 71 And
prisoners' dilemmas just epitomize trustlessness in social affairs.
c.

Rationality, Trust, and the "Tragedy of the Commons"

The pessimistic view of human capacity for trustful cooperation has found its
special metaphor in the "commons" upon which preindustrial villagers grazed
their cattle.
The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course... to pursue is to
add another animal to [its] herd. And another; and another .... But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons....
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
72
commons.
The "commons" stands for isomorphic predicaments observed in modern
life, most typically associated with environmental degradation: "The rational man
finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less
than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for
everyone, we are locked into a system of 'fouling our own nest.""' A comparable
case is said to be presented by "freedom to breed" in the setting of a modern
welfare state commitment to social support for the needy: "To couple the concept
of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone horn has an equal right to the
commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action."74
All these can be recognized as instances of the general configuration of
interests called by Schelling "multi-person prisoner's dilemma," and abstractly
modeled by him as follows:
1. There are n people, each with the same binary choice and the same
payoffs."

69. See e.g. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure,72 0. J. Econ. 351 (1958).
70. See text accompanying infra nn. 72-75.
71. See Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Harv. U. Press 1971).
72. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in Economic Foundations of Property Law 2, 4
(Bruce A. Ackerman ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1975) (reprinting 162 Science 1243 (1968)).
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (W.W. Norton & Co. 1978). The
"commons" problem can be cast into this "binary choice" form by characterizing the choice facing each
herdsman as that of grazing or not grazing more than c head on the commons, where c is a constant
number.
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2. Each has a preferred choice whatever the others do; and the same choice
is preferred by everybody.
3. Whichever choice a person makes, he or she is better off, the more there
are among the others who choose their unpreferred alternative.
4. There is some number, k, greater than 1, such that if individuals
numbering k or more choose their unpreferred alternative and the rest do
not, those who do are better off than if they had all chosen their preferred
alternatives, but if they number less then k this is not true.
Is the situation thus depicted truly such that self-interested agents are
rationally driven to reciprocal self-destruction? Does the way to salvation truly lie
only through abolition of the freedom of the commons in favor of regulation
through property rights or collective control? Cooperation based on mutual trust,
if that is conceivable for rationally self-interested human agents, would avoid the
catastrophe as well; so if cooperative behavior is rationally possible, then
commonses are not generically tragic. But cooperative behavior must be possible
if avoidance of commonses is practically discussable at all; for the policy of
extirpating commonses in favor of property rights (or other regulation) assuredly
depends on the possibility of cooperation.
What is private property, regarded from the standpoint of economic policy,
but a particular form of regulation, 6 a species of those "definite social
arrangements . . . that create coercion of some sort,"77 institution of which is
offered as the alternative to tragedy? But then come the questions: Instituted
(fashioned, decided upon) by whom? Policed and enforced by whom? Obeyed by
whom, and why? Because if (and only if!) I don't obey, the constable will catch
me, the prosecutor try me, the magistrate convict me, the sheriff punish me? Who
will make them? Where can the regress end, if not in uncoerced cooperation, the
untragic commons of constitutional practice founded on a "rule" that there is no
one to enforce but that people on the whole adhere to, though adherence is in the
interest of no one who does not trust that (most) others will adhere to it, by
"mutual agreement."78 In other words: no trust, no property. In the very survival
of proprietary institutions we have empirical evidence of the possibility of trust; as
we have in the electorate's behavior each election day.79
Short of absurdity, then, the metaphor of the commons cannot speak to us
more powerfully of the rational necessity of social cooperation than of its rational
possibility. In this dialectic of necessity and possibility, private property emerges
as a possible device or instrumentality for social cooperation-available, as such,
only to agents who have, in the first place, a capacity for cooperative action. The

76. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra n. 4, at 769-70.
77. Hardin, supra n. 72, at 9.
78. Id. at 10.
79. It has often been observed that, according to rational calculation, the costs to an individual
voter of casting a vote on election day must virtually always exceed the expected value to the voter of
casting the vote. See e.g. Downs, supra n. 68.
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initial premise has to be that of cooperative capacity; it cannot be the
contradictory of that.
Since cooperation is-has to be-both possible and existent without and
prior to property, the domain of property cannot be coextensive with that of the
commons (all commonses). Property is a scheme of social cooperation whose
utility is always a question for judgment and choice, dependent on multiple
considerations varying with the circumstances, rather than impelled by some
universal and inexorable grim logic of welfare. In any given commons, property
may offer the best mode of cooperation, but it also may not.
4.

The Additional Premises in Aggregate

I have said that the truth of at least one of the additional premises is a
necessary condition of the truth of PET. It is not, however, a sufficient condition.
The truth of PET entails further conditions respecting the premises in partial and
total aggregates. To exhibit the full complement of further conditions would be
tiresome. A single example will suffice both to illustrate their nature and to
advance my argument.
Suppose premise 3 were false, the truth being that people generally and
strongly prefer to work out their affairs cooperatively or politically, rather than by
arm's-length dealings on markets. Suppose also that there were convincing
empirical evidence for the truth of any or all of premises 4-7. PET as a whole
would remain empirically unverified, because the gains in product that premises
4-7 supposedly tell us will result from shifting to PP from SON or REG may be
more than offset by the loss in satisfaction from that same shift implied by the
supposed falsity of premise 3. But premise 3 can be no more empirically false than
empirically true: it is, inescapable, quasi empirical. As long as it remains so, so
does PET. Proof of PET strictly requires empirical verification of all the
additional premises. No doubt verification of all but one or two of them would
make PET highly plausible. But verification of only one or two-which seems the
most that can be claimed at present-only marginally affects plausibility.
V.

WHY DOES PET MATTER?

There is an illuminating literature in economics devoted to explaining how
and why property institutions are efficient when and insofar as they sometimes,
indubitably, are 8° Some of that literature seems to make rather sweeping claims
on behalf of private property-to treat it, indeed, as presumptively efficient.
None that I know of expressly purports to deduce the general efficiency of private
property without reliance on behavioral premises additional to that of rationality,
and a careful reader can always infer the additional premises that must be implicit
in the literature's accounts of the efficiency virtues of private property.

80. E.g. Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster
Industry, 18 J.L. & Econ. 521 (1975); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am.
Econ. Rev. 347 (1967).
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The aim of this chapter, then, is not to disprove an explicit thesis elsewhere
espoused, but rather to urge the importance of making additional premises
explicit. Doing so will, I believe, help avoid the danger that efficiency-based
accounts of private property institutions will obscure the critical vision that ought
to be directed toward such institutions as they are found from time to time in
actual practice.
Here is the critique of PET in a nutshell. Whoever thinks that private
property is a good thing is committed to some belief in addition to (i) experience
accrues to individuals, (ii) individuals are rational maximizers of satisfactions, and
(iii) it is good to allow for an increase in the levels of satisfaction experienced by
individuals. The necessary additional belief may be quasi empirical, such as (a)
every properly formed human individual places a supremely high value on secure
command over his or her body, labor, and product, or (b) to a degree that makes
the exceptions practically negligible, rational conation in socially situated human
individuals always takes the form of the trustless "prisoner" mentality. Or the
necessary additional belief may be purely moral, such as (c) irrespective of what
various individuals may subjectively want, it is right that each person should be
secured in the command over his or her own person; or it may be a composite of
moral and empirical belief such as (d) justice requires that the distribution among
members of a society of the means to satisfaction periodically satisfy the minimal
requirements of D; 8' and the only regimes that will satisfy D (or will satisfy D
without excessive sacrifice of efficiency) are, as it happens, private property
regimes. The critique of PET, then, is a challenge to all defenders of private
property to know their additional premises.
The point is not that the serviceable additional premises are all invalid or
indefensible. Far from it. Rather the point is that many-it may be all-of the
appealing additional premises are potentially the grounds of significantly critical
appraisal of the particular, detailed embodiment of private property we may from
time to time observe in practice. Suppose, for example, you think that the
efficiency of private property is rooted in a species-characteristic need or craving
for privacy and security of person, or for the experience of self-command over
personal labor and product. Then if you observed a society in which measurable
numbers of persons were selling rights over their bodies in exchange for the means
of subsistence, or could live only by submitting to the productive direction of
others, you would have to see that situation as problematic. Though it might turn
out that there is no way, in this vale of tears, to make things on the whole any
better, you would be committed to at least searching for some corrective.
Similarly if your commitment to private property were more generally based on a
conviction that only a property regime could hope to satisfy distributional
criterion D at a tolerable level of efficiency, then you would be committed as well
to continual scanning of the extant regime to see whether it was in fact resulting in
a D-satisfactory distribution, and to support of corrective action whenever such

81. See supra pt. II.C.
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was both needed and available. And suppose, finally, that your commitment to
private property was rooted in belief that individuals do, as a matter of fact,
usually exhibit prisoner rationality in their encounters with one another. It is at
least a possibility that you would, on further reflection, think that a world truly
void of social trust would be an extremely dangerous place, and also that the
relation between the condition of trustlessness and given institutions of private
property might be not unidirectional but reciprocal-so that not only is private
property a prudent response to a given state of trustlessness, but also particular
private property arrangements sanction and reinforce trustlessness. With that
provisional view, you might want to keep on investigating, rather than considering
the matter closed.
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